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Leibniz and Ramanuja on the One and the
Many
Tinu Ruparell
University of Calgary

THE polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646-1716 CE) and the Visistadvaita
theologian Ramanuja (c. 1017-1137 CE )
both face a similar conceptual problem:
each holds that the universe is composed of
a single substance yet is experienced by us
in the phenomenal realm as plural. The
problem, simply put, is that they must both
show how it is that our experience of
diversity arises from ontological unity how the many comes from the one. In what
follows I suggest that reading Leibniz
through Ramanuja in the way suggested by
the structure of metaphorical dialectic as
elucidated by Ricoeur and exploited by
Clooneyl (among others) casts Leibniz's
problem in a more helpful light. As I show
below, such a reading facilitates for Leibniz
Ramanuja's
dialectic
or
'polarity'
theological method In order to nuance
Leibniz's discussion of well-founded
phenomena.
This provides a better
understanding of the relationship between
fundamental or primary monadic substances
such as God and non-primary monadic
created reality. Firstly, however, we must
rehearse a little of Leibniz's Monadology in
order to indicate where Ramanuja's method
might usefully be employed.
Leibniz begins his Monadology
with a very simple and brief argument:

1. The Monad, which we shall discuss
here, IS nothing but a simple
substance
that
enters
into
composites - simple, that is, without
parts.
2. And there must be simple
substances
since
there
are
-composites; for the composite is
nothing more than a collection, or
aggregate, of simples.
3. But where there are no parts, neither
extension, nor shape, nor divisibility
is possible. These monads are the
true atoms of nature and, in brief,
the elements of things.
4. There is no dissolution to fear, and
there is no conceivable way in
which a simple substance can perish
naturally.
S.For the same reason there is no
conceivable way a simple substance
can begin naturally, since it cannot
be formed by composition.
6. Thus one can say that monads can
only _begin by creation and end by
annihilation, whereas composites
begin or end through their parts.
7. There is also no way of explaining
how a monad can be altered or
changed internally by some other
creature, since one cannot transpose
anything in it, nor can one conceive
-of any internal motion that can be
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excited, directed, augmented or
diminished within it, as can be done
in composites, where there can be
change among the parts.
The
monads have no windows through
which something can enter or leave.
Accidents cannot be detached, nor
can they go about outside of
substances, as the sensible species
of the Scholastics once did. Thus,
neither substance nor accident can
enter a monad from without.
8. However monads have some
qualities otherwise they would not
even be beings. And if simple
substances did not differ at all in
their qualities, there would be no
way of perceiving any change from
its simple ingredients; and if the
monads had no qualities, they would
be indiscernible from one another,
since they also do not differ in
quantity. As a result, assuming a
plenum, in motion, each place
would always receive only the
equivalent of what it already had,
and one state of things would be
indistinguishable from another.
9. It is also necessary that each monad
be different from each other. For
there are never two beings in nature
that are perfectly alike, two beings
in which it is not possible to
discover an internal difference, that
is . one founded on intrinsic
denomination.
10. I also take it for granted that every
created being, and consequently
every created monad as well, is
subject to change, and even that this
change is continual in each being. 2
We can see that his argument follows
deductively. Premises I and 2 are merely
definitions, 2 being a corollary of 1. Simple
substances, which Leibniz calls monads, are
defined as entities without parts, and
composite entities are those made up of
parts. As two sides of a coin the two are
both mutually exclusive and dependent. So
far so good; I expect that most people would
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agree with Leibniz's fairly innocuous
premises. Premise 3 is the most important
for our purposes. If a thing has no parts,
then it follows that it has no front side, or
part, nor a backside, left or right. If it has no
sides or parts then it cannot be extended in
space, andI if it is not extended in space, then
. it is not material in the ordinary (Cartesian)
way.3 Monads are also, Leibniz goes on,
indivisible, since if they were divisible they
could in principl~ be divided into left and
right, or greater and lesser parts. But being
defined as simple substances they cannot
have parts and thus they cannot be divisible.
These three premises are actually
quite radical and certainly ahead of
Leibniz's time for they foreshadow both
modern atomic theory as well as aspects of
quantum theory. They are also in many
ways the foundations of Leibniz's mature
thought. Indeed the importance of the idea
of the monad can hardly be underplayed in
the full flowermg of Leibniz's metaphysics;
however the full implications of this notion
were hardly felt in his time. The monad is a
perplexing creature and we shall see just
how queer it is below. Three further
, premises need comment at this stage.
Premises 4-6 are also corollaries of
the basic notion of a simple substance.
Leibniz argues that a monad cannot perish
naturally since natural construction and
destruction are in fact simply the breaking
down or building up of composites. When
we naturally destroy a brick, we get dust the brick is a composite, and, in crushing it
we have simply made it a large pile of
smaller composites.
We could go on
crushing this dust ad infinitum, and while
eventually it may look like we have
destroyed the brick entirely, the law of
conservation of matter tells us that the atoms
of the brick are not destroyed but rather
transformed into invisible atoms or perhaps
into different kinds of atoms. The basic
units cannot be destroyed and for the same
reason caruiot be created either: for Leibniz
they come into being and are annihilated
solely at God's behest. So we arrive at the
notion that a monad is a simple, immaterial
substance able to aggregate into composites
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and which can neither be destroyed nor
created naturally.
Now most of what Leibniz has just
stated should be familiar enough to modem
scientific realists. Leibniz's premises make
sense in our experience of the world. We
now accept that we do not destroy matter
nor create it so much as simply push it
about or pull it apart.
Secondly the
definition of a simple substance seems noncontroversial: simples cannot have parts and
complexes are made of simples. But the
consequences of ~hese few premises are
. staggering. That the world is made of
complexes seems patently true; however
Leibniz has argued that the simples making
up these complexes must be immaterial. To
, put it another way: if the primary substance
of creation is immaterial then the world of
complexes, the world we experience in
normal sensory life, must be very different
than it appears.
The counter-intuitiveness of this
position is difficult to exaggerate. Indeed'
the claim that the world is at its foundations
immaterial was one of the reasons why
Leibniz's mature metaphysics have not only.
been disputed but also derided. How is it
that the patently hard substance making up
all material things in the universe could be
of incorporeal
composed
ultimately
substance?4 How do conglomerations of
Leibniz's immaterial entities add up to the
very real impenetrability experienced when I
stub my toe, on the leg of the table on which
I now write? To dispute the materiality of
the cosmos might seem counter-intuitive at
best, but Leibniz's premises are difficult to
reject out of hand. As mentioned above,
they do follow deductively, and the
foundational premises - those that count seem to be analytically true. I find it
difficult not to be convinced by Leibniz's
basic arguments, but as we shall see later,
Leibniz does face some significant
problems. 5
Now before we consider monads
further, let us first follow our train of
thought through so that we are sure just what
is at stake if Leibniz is right. If the basic
substance of the universe is immaterial, then
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our experience of the world of matter is
either in significant ways false or deluded
and hence we must revise our view of the
physical world. Leibniz inherited Descartes'
legacy of the problem of interactionism:
how it is that res (cogitans (thinking stuff,
mind) relates and i'nteracts with res extensa
(extended stuff, bodies)? This was a serious
difficulty for Descartes who never
developed a convincing' explanation for
everyday occurrences such as human
locomotion. Spinoza and Leibniz provided
two coherent responses to the problem of
interaction, Leibniz's being to deny that
corporeal matter existed, or rather he
asserted that matter was in fact monadic in
composition. For Leibniz, all that exists is
mind D or rather soul-like entities some of
which exhibit properties of mind6 D which
merely appear to be substantial in the way
that we regularly experience the physical
world. Clearly. for Leibniz, the universe is
not in itself the way we normally experience
it. It is very different from what our senses
tell us it is, though of course at the level of
ordinary perception the world does work in
regular harmonious ways. That the universe
functions harmoniously and predictably was
important to affirm in the early modem
period as the then nascent science was
quickly coming fo dominate the intellectual
tradition of western Europe. Importantly,
the world as describable through science
was for Leibniz entirely compatible with
monads. We should not therefore think that
the world is some kind of illusion.7 Leibniz
emphatically maintains that the world is
real, but monadic, that is immaterial.
, Now (let us very quickly take this
train of thought to its ultimate end. If the
universe is immaterial and this means that it
, is composed of what Leibniz terms 'soullike entities' (some of which have the
properties of minds) then how is it that what
we see around us has effects on other
things? If a train is a composition of
monads, or soul-like entities, how is it that
so much death and' destruction ensues when
it goes off the rails or collides with another
train, or should we say, another collection of
soul-like entities? Leibniz's answer is that

3
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monads as immaterial atomic entities
or
cognize
each
other. 8
perceive
Furthermore there is a natural tendency
within monads for perceptions to change, to
be in process and drive forward as a measure
and element of time - this Leibniz calls a
monad's appetition or desire. So Leibniz
suggests that a monad is related to other
monads through thinking them, and being
thought by them in a continuing process.
And because in principle anyone monad,
whether singly or in concert, can come into
contact with any other monad, each monad
is related to all others - each monad
perceives and is perceived by all other
monads. 9
How is it that monads are able to do
this? Leibniz holds that they were created to
do so by God who organises all of these
relations in the most harmonious way. Each
monad is related in a particular way to all
other monads in a system of pre-established
harmony. The principle of pre-established
harmony, for which Leibniz was equally
celebrated and ridiculed,IO follows from
Leibniz's view of God's omnipotence,
omniscience and absolute goodness. Being
omniscient, God knows the ideal state of the
universe, being omnipotent God can create
this state and being absolutely good, God is
duty bound to actually create it. The world
as we have it is, for Leibniz, the best of all
possible worlds since it actualises the most
harmony between all of its related monads.
We should note here also that God is seen
by Leibniz to be a monad as well, though a
monad distinguished from all others by
having all perfections and being, uniquely, a
necessary monad. 11
Now that we have a clearer view of
just the kind of world Leibniz is letting us
into, we can return to the notion of monads
and their nature.
In §7-8 of the
Monadology, Leibniz states that for things to
have different qualities, yet all be composed
of immaterial monads, monads must each
have the possibility of multitudinous
simultaneous modifications. Monads must
bear some qualities, for if they were not
distinguishable in this way, it would be
possible for two different monads to be
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identical - clearly logically impossible.
Leibniz draws an even stronger conclusion
however in that not only are all monads in
principle distinguishable, they must all be
individually unique - each monad must be
different from every other monad .. ".
In § 10 Leibniz further states as an
axiom that 'every created being, and
consequently the created monad as well, is
subject to change and even that this change
is continual in each thing.' Weare now
getting closer to a complete picture of
monads. Monads are fundamental principles
of action whose state at any time is defined
by a multitude of cognitions, that is relations
to other monads, and subject to constant
change reflecting their continuing alteration
with respect to other monads. The relation of
monads forms a dynamic network where
each node (each monad) continually alters
and 1~ altered by the other continuously
changing nodes in real time.
At this point let me summarize what
we know about monads: firstly they are
simple, eternal and immaterial. Secondly
they form together in composites to make up
what we experience as the world around us.
However as immaterial entities, they cannot
be related in a Newtonian sense, but rather
are interrelated through perception and
appetition: they think and are thought by
other monads. Thirdly they are individual
and particular - each monad being unique
by virtue· of its particular intrinsic relations
to all others. Now the main problem that
arises for Leibniz is how to explain the
'hardness' of the exp~rienced world. 12
How is it that we seem to experience
objective material reality when in fact all
that there actually is in the universe are
immaterial entities and the subjective
relations between them? Leibniz seems to
have two stories to tell at this stage. The
first makes bodies the appearances of
collections of monads.
This is the
phenomenalist interpretation where bodies
do not themselves have independent realities
but are the appearances of collected monads.
Just as a flock of sheep is only a flock in the
mind of the perceiver, bodies do not have
independent realities apart from their
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appearances. Bodies are what collections of
monads look like to other collections of
monads. This interpretation makes Leibniz
rather close to Berkeley's esse est percipi
where bodies rely for their existence on their
being perceived.
The other, and some argue
incompatible,
interpretation
is
the
aggregationist view. . Here bodies are well
founded (benefundatum) phenomena, to use
Leibniz's phrase. Bodies are real (though
dependent) aggregates of real substantial
unities. On this view what you get when
you analyse bodies 'all the way down' as it
were, are nothing but simple, immaterial
unities, which are, of course, monads. Ifthis
is the case, moving back to the level of our
normal experience must yield bodies which
are merely the aggregates of monads. These
monadic aggregates perceive themselves as
an, "embodied creature that stands in spatiotemporal and causal relations to every other
body in the universe, and hence to every
other body that is represented by another
monad as its body.,,13
While sometimes complicated to
distinguish, these two interpretations are, I
suggest, pulling in opposite directions. The
phenomenalist sees the material bodies
which make up our normal experience as
unreal but understandable appearances of
immaterial monads.
The aggregationist
demurs maintaining that material bodies are
well founded phenomena - the real
aggregates of real substantial unities.
Now there is a great deal of debate
in Leibniz studies on this problem but I
cannot here run through the . various
arguments on both sides. Suffice it to say
that the situation seems to be at a stalemate,
the various responses dependent on what
one sees to be at stake in the question: the
sensibility of I"eibniz's metaphysical system
or the corporeal reality of the physical
world. It is here where I think we can profit
by bringing Ramanuja into the fray.
Of the large corpus of Ramanuja's
thought I will focus only on those- aspects
which I will put to use for Leibniz. We
should note, -however, that prima facie
Visistadvaita shares some significant
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concepts with Leibnizian idealism: indeed
reading the first part of the Monadology
through Visistadvaitan eyes is revealing. In
the fIrst sections of the Monadology one
could read atman (or jivatman as the
particularised form of. atman associated with
prakritic bodies) for monad. In this sense
the jivatman is simple, immaterial, and
eternal. It is also, as related to Bralupan (as
maha atman), the fundamental element of
the universe -with the prakritic or material
elements with which it is associated being
merely the primeval evolutes-' of original
purusha (Brahman). Each jivatman is also
unique, differing from each other in
precisely the same way that monads differ:
they have varying degrees of perfection
partially due to their specific co-relation to
all other jivatmans and to Brahman. Where
the monad and jivatman differ is in the fact
that the jivatman does not aggregate into
composites to form phenomenal bodies.
The relationship of individual souls
(jivatmans) to each other and to their creator
(Brahman) is the subject of Ramanuja's
principle doctrine of the world as God's
body, and it is to this that we now turn.
Ramanuja construes the God-world
relationship along the general analogy that
God is to the universe as our souls are to our
bodies: 14 To develop this Ramanuja uses the
primary relationship of mode (prakara) and
mode-possessor (prakarin) to describe how
it is that a body is related to the self or
atman. This relation is further subdivided
into three sub or correlative relationships:
(1) the support (adhara) J thing-supported
(adlieya) relationship; (2) the controller
(niyantr) / thing-controlled (niyama)
relationship; and (3) the principal (sesinJ-l/
accessory (sesa) relationship. I do not have
space to consider each of these relations
separately, but a consideration of the prakara
/ prakarin paradigm will do for our purposes.
Put very simply, the mode (prakara)
is that which is made manifest and the
mode-possessor (prakarin) is that which
manifests the mode. In Leibnizian terms,
the mode-possessor is the monad and the
mode its perceptions. Ramanuja explains it
thus:

5
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This is the relation between the self
(atman) and its body (in the sense
we are considering): the relation
between
support
and
thingsupported such that the latter is
incapable of being realised apart
from the former, that between
controller and thing-controlled, and
that
between
principal
and
accessory. The atman [ . . .] is that
which in every respect is the
support, controller and principal of
what is the thing -supported,
controlled and the accessory, viz.
the 'body' or form which exists as a
mode (of the mode-possessor, i.e.
atman), incapable of being realised
apart (from the latter). Now this is
the relationship between the (finite)
individual self and its own
(material) body. 15
Lipner points out that there are both
ontological and epistemological implications
of the mode/mode-possessor relationship.16
The ontological aspect is brought out in the
quotation above by the phrase 'incapable of
being realised apart from the [mode
possessor].' This is a dependence of being
such that the mode cannot exist without the
absolute support of the mode-possessor.
Moreover, this is true regardless of whether"
the mode is material or not. Carman notes,
in this regard, that Ramanuja privileges the
body-self relationship as more fundamental
than
the
mode-mode
possessor
relationship. I?
The latter is a general
relationship, and it is clear, for Ramanuja
that general characteristics depend for their
existence on their being possessed by some
substance. So, for example, 'heaviness" (a
mode) is a general characteristic which
requires for its existence the existence of
something else (its mode-possessor).
'Heaviness' cannot exist on its own unpossessed by some substance. But this
general characteristic is secondary to the
particular 'body-self relationship.
The
body is, for Ramanuja, paradigmatieally the
mode of the self or atman (the mode-
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possessor). Carman explains this view thus:
"to say that something is a mode is just a
. brief way of stating its relationship of utter
dependence, but to state that something is a
body is to state an irreducible and
fundamental fact.
Therefore it is this
category which is fundamental. If a material
thing is the body of some intelligent self,
then it is a mode.,,18 This is an important
point since it allows that bodies, that is, a
kind of material substance (dravya), can be
modes of selves (atman) - which are also
substances, and that, by analogy, creatures
such as humans can thus be modes of the
supreme self, Brahman. 19 If we accept
Ramanuja's argument here, we can
immediately lay to rest the question of how
atmans, which are substances, can be modes
of another substance, Brahman.
This is also rather important for our
comparative exercise since if we appropriate
Ramanuja's notion of the world as God's
body for Leibniz, then the mode/mode
possessor relationship entails that not only
are physical/phenomenal bodies modes or
forms of their monadic selves, but each
created monad (which are substantial
unities) can be seen as bodies of the ultimate
monad which is God. This is a significant
re-narration of Leibniz who assumes the
Christian ultimate separation of God and
creation D even though by his own lights
both creation and God are monadic in
nature. Leibniz's view of God, which I only
touched on earlier, is that God is the perfect,
uniquely self-created monad. As such God
differs from all other mon~ds not in kind but
in degree only. Ramanuja's view of the
world as God's body is ironically more
consistent with God as a monad than
Leibniz's capitulation to the conventional
Christian standpoint, since on Ramanuja's
view there is no substantial distinction
between creation and the divine.
Lipner's epistemological aspect of
the
mode/mode-possessor
relationship
shows that the mode does not 'make sense'
without reference to the mode-possessor,
that is, the mode lacks a raison d'etre.
Lipner alludes to Ramanuja's example of
staffs and earrings to illustrate. A staff or an
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earring, though they each have their own
individual, substantive existence apart from
anything else, cannot have their purpose
fulfilled or realised in seclusion. They
require a staff-bearer or earring-wearer to
fully be what they are. A certain thing can
thus only be known as itself within its
rightful mode/mode-possessor relationship.
Leibniz's echo of this is found in the
notion of pre-established harmony. Each
monad can only be what it is by virtue of its
correlation to all other monads - that is in its
proper relation. No individual monad can be
what it is much less achieve its perfection in
isolation. And again, Ramanuja's body of
God doctrine helps to make sense of this
since this harmony is justified not by' the
will of God (as in Leibniz) but in the
necessity of God's own body. The harmony
of the universe is transformed from a
particular and somewhat implausible
proposition about a world apart from God
into the perfection found within God itself.
It reflects a more perfect necessity.
'
So on Ramanuja's view, the world
is God's 'body' in that the universe is the
manifestation of the effected Brahman,
completely dependent for its very being and
meaning on the Absolute One, existing
(ideally) only in order to serve and glorify
its Lord. In this, respect Brahman is both the
efficient and material cause of the universeits creator - as well as the resultant effect,
the universe itself. Ramanuja explains this
as the dual nature of Brahman's existence:
as Brahman in his causal condition (brahma
karanavastham) and Brahman in his effected
condition (brahma karyavastham).2o
In
Leibnizian terms the material universe
becomes the body of God - with God being
the universe's perfect and primary monad.
As its body, the universe shares its monadic
nature with God but just as our own bodies
do not exhaust our selves, God as the
monadic maha atman is not exhausted by the
universe, and certainly not as we experience
it. Moreover the doctrine of pre-established
harmony is set in a more elegant context
when seen not as the fortunate result of a
created universe but rather as the inner
harmony of a perfect GOd?l
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Having heard Ramanuja, we can
now return to our Leibnizian problem of
giving an account of the 'hardness' of the
world - that is an understanding of the
physical world. Either corporeal bodies are
mere appearances, that is the way collected
monads look to each other; or they are the
dependently real result of an aggregation of
monads. Ramanuja faced a similar problem
in trying to understand the identity-indifference which obtains between individual
jivatmans and the divine Brahman and he
solves it through the particular method of his
theology. Lipner calls this method 'polarity
theology' aria we can understand it' by
considering again the term Visistadvaita.
Visistadvaita, as Lipner has it, is
reflected in two complementary discourses,
corresponding to two mahavakyas (great
sayings) of the Upanishads. As Ramanuja
needed to remain within the theologically
important 'literal' interpretation of the
scriptures, he needed to affirm both the '
rriayhavakyas of the Taittiriya Upanishad
(Brahman is saccidananda
reality,
knowledge, infinite) and oftheChandogya
Upanishad (tat tvam asi - That thou art).22
In order to do so he spoke of the God-world
relationship in two ways:' from top down,
that is, from the perspective of Brahman,
and from the bottom up, that is, from our
creaturely vantage point.23 From, top down
the world is not distinct from Brahman;
everything deriving from, gaining sense with
respect to, and maintained by the Absolute
One without a second. Here there is no
difference between Brah1I).an and the world,
the universe being nothing but Brahman in
'effected' or manifest state. This collapsing
of difference Lipner calls the centripetal
tendency of Ramanuja's theology. From the
point of view of creatures, however, there is
great distinction since Brahman is perfect in
all qualities, infinite and necessary, 24 and
thus, of course, very different from creation.
Lipner refers to this separating movement as
the centrifugal tendency. The picture of
Brahman e'merging 'from Ramanuja is that of
Brahman encompassing a dialectic tension
between the centripetal and centrifugal,
between the One and the many. This view

7
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makes creation both quasi-autonomous yet
inseparable from its source, sustenance and
end.
It makes Brahman and creation
identical or non-dual but, in the dialectic of
centrifugal and centripetal - a dialectic
which mirrors that of comparative
conversations such as this -also particular.
This is what is meant by identity-indifference or 'qualified non-dualism.'
Now Ramanuja:s polarity theology,
through which the notion of Visistadvaita is
communicated, can also be applied to
Leibniz. In what might be called a typical
Vedantic style Leibniz's solution is found
not in the either/or of phenomenalism or
aggregationism, but in the both-and ,of
Visistadvaita. Understood from the bottom
up, monads combine to form dependently
real aggregates, while from the top down
phenomenal material nature is understood'to
be founded in and derived from monadic
reality. We have in this tense dialectic not
only squared Leibniz's circle but in the
process given more coherence to his view
that God is a monad as well as greater
substance to the doctrine of pre-established
harmony.
Of course this kind of consolation of
Leibniz's metaphysics was .not available to
Leibniz himself for various historical and,
more importantly, theological reasons. One
might object that on these grounds such a
reading of Leibniz is illegitimate. Clearly I
must disagree with such a complaint, though
I cannot moul}t a defence here. Rather I
submit the discussion now concluded as an
experiment in comparative philosophy of
religion and leave my readers the task of its
evaluation and, hopefully, continuation.
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